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McCullen v. Coakley 
12-1168 
Ruling Below: McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert granted, 2013 WL 
1218466 (U.S. 2013). 
Massachusetts residents who regularly engaged in pro-life counseling outside reproductive health 
care facilities brought action against Massachusetts' Attorney General, challenging revised 
Massachusetts statute, which made it a crime for speakers other than clinic employees acting 
within the scope of their employment to be on a public sidewalk within thirty-five feet of an 
entrance, exit, or driveway of a reproductive health care facility. The United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts, upheld the act. Residents appealed.  The First Circuit held that 
law of the case doctrine precluded revisiting facial challenges; employees loitering in buffer zone 
did not reflect a viewpoint preference of the state; and residents had adequate alternative means 
of communication. 
Question Presented: (1) Whether the First Circuit erred in upholding Massachusetts’s selective 
exclusion law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on its face and as applied to 
petitioners; and (2) whether, if Hill v. Colorado permits enforcement of this law, Hill should be 
limited or overruled. 
 
 
Eleanor McCULLEN et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
v. 
Martha COAKLEY et al., Defendants, Appellees.  
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit 
Decided on January 9, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
SELYA, Circuit Judge 
This case does not come to us as a stranger. 
At the turn of the century, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed a law that created fixed 
and floating buffer zones around abortion 
clinics. We rejected serial challenges to the 
constitutionality of that law. The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.  
One might have thought that the matter 
would end there, but it did not. In 2007, the 
legislature revisited the statute and amended 
it to create a fixed thirty-five-foot buffer 
zone around the entrances, exits, and 
driveways of abortion clinics. The revised 
statute drew renewed fire and, in 2009, we 
upheld it against a facial challenge. This 
decision left open the plaintiffs' as-applied 
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challenge, and they unsuccessfully pursued 
that initiative in the district court.  
The plaintiffs again appeal. They advance a 
salmagundi of arguments, old and new, 
some of which are couched in a creative 
recalibration of First Amendment principles. 
Few subjects have proven more 
controversial in modern times than the issue 
of abortion. The nation is sharply divided 
about the morality of the practice and its 
place in a caring society. But the right of the 
state to take reasonable steps to ensure the 
safe passage of persons wishing to enter 
healthcare facilities cannot seriously be 
questioned. The Massachusetts statute at 
issue here is a content-neutral, narrowly 
tailored time-place-manner regulation that 
protects the rights of prospective patients 
and clinic employees without offending the 
First Amendment rights of others. We 
therefore affirm the judgment below. 
I. BACKGROUND 
We briefly recount the historical background 
and travel of the case and then describe the 
particular circumstances concerning the 
three clinic locations that lie at the epicenter 
of the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge. 
A. Travel of the Case. 
The centerpiece of this saga is Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 266, § 120E 1/2 (2007) (the Act). 
The provenance and pertinent provisions of 
the Act are set out in some detail in 
McCullen I and we assume the reader's 
familiarity with that account. We rehearse 
here only what is necessary to place into 
perspective the issues on appeal. 
The Act states in pertinent part that “[n]o 
person shall knowingly enter or remain on a 
public way or sidewalk adjacent to a 
reproductive health care facility” (RHCF) 
within a designated and clearly marked 
buffer zone. The buffer zone spans 
a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an 
entrance, exit or driveway of a[n RHCF] 
or within the area within a rectangle 
created by extending the outside 
boundaries of any entrance, exit or 
driveway of a[n RHCF] in straight lines 
to the point where such lines intersect the 
sideline of the street in front of such 
entrance, exit or driveway. 
Four categories of persons identical to those 
enumerated in the 2000 version of the law 
are exempted: 
(1) persons entering or leaving such facility; 
(2) employees or agents of such facility 
acting within the scope of their employment; 
(3) law enforcement, ambulance, 
firefighting, construction, utilities, public *4 
works and other municipal agents acting 
within the scope of their employment; and 
(4) persons using the public sidewalk or 
street right-of-way adjacent to such facility 
solely for the purpose of reaching a 
destination other than such facility. 
On January 25, 2008, the Massachusetts 
Attorney General sent a letter to a wide 
audience, including RHCF personnel and 
law enforcement agencies. The text of the 
letter is reproduced as an appendix to our 
opinion in McCullen I. Its stated purpose is 
to summarize the provisions of the Act and 
offer “guidance to assist [ ] in applying the 
four exemptions.” 
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On January 16, 2008, the plaintiffs brought 
this action against the Massachusetts 
Attorney General in the federal district 
court. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they 
alleged a plethora of constitutional claims. 
The district court bifurcated the case, 
separating the plaintiffs' facial challenge 
from their as-applied challenge. In due 
season, the court addressed the facial 
challenge and upheld the Act. 
On appeal, we affirmed, holding the Act to 
be content-neutral, viewpoint-neutral, and a 
valid time-place-manner regulation. At the 
same time, we rebuffed the plaintiffs' 
overbreadth claim, citing Hill v. Colorado, 
in which the Supreme Court upheld a 
Colorado statute regulating communicative 
activities within 100 feet of healthcare 
facility entrances. We likewise rejected the 
plaintiffs' vagueness claim (which focused 
on the Attorney General's letter), explaining 
that such an attempt at interpretive guidance 
cannot alter the meaning of a law that is 
clear on its face. Finally, we ruled that the 
Act did not constitute an unlawful prior 
restraint on protected speech.  
When the dust had settled, the district court 
took up the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge. 
As a threshold matter, it invoked the law of 
the case doctrine and resisted the plaintiffs' 
attempt to reargue the facial constitutionality 
of the Act. Next, it granted the defendants' 
motion for judgment on the pleadings with 
respect to seven as-applied counts. Turning 
to whether the Act, as applied, constituted a 
valid time-place-manner regulation, the 
court concluded that the only trialworthy 
issue concerned the adequacy of alternative 
channels of communication at the 
challenged facilities. Following a bench 
trial, the court upheld the Act as applied.  
B. The Three Sites. 
We rehearse the evidence anent the relevant 
clinic locations. As a prelude, we note that 
each of the plaintiffs engages in 
communicative activities outside one of 
these three RHCFs. 
1. Boston. The Boston clinic is situated in a 
free-standing building at 1055 
Commonwealth Avenue (a main 
thoroughfare in the Brighton section of 
Boston). Its front door faces Commonwealth 
Avenue; its rear garage entrance faces 
Gardner Street. All clinic patients enter 
through the front door and must use the 
twenty-five-foot-wide public sidewalk along 
Commonwealth Avenue. Buffer zones, 
marked with yellow arcs and posted signs, 
are appurtenant to each entrance. 
Three of the plaintiffs (McCullen, Cadin, 
and Zarrella) regularly engage in “sidewalk 
counseling” at the Boston clinic. McCullen 
parks her car on Commonwealth Avenue 
and festoons it with pro-life signage; 
Zarrella sometimes prays aloud; and Cadin 
from time to time holds aloft a large pro-life 
sign. 
A fourth plaintiff, Smith, has demonstrated 
outside the Boston clinic for many years. He 
has displayed a crucifix, sung religious 
hymns, and prayed aloud. His prayers are 
meant to be heard by passersby in hopes of 
persuading them to opt against abortion. He 
sometimes brings a loudspeaker to amplify 
group prayers that occur outside the clinic 
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on the second Saturday of every month and 
on Good Friday. 
The plaintiffs insist that they have achieved 
success in their counseling efforts: they 
speak with prospective patients, elicit 
responses, and hand out literature. In some 
instances, they have persuaded women to 
decide against terminating pregnancies. 
McCullen estimates that, during the period 
between November 2007 and May 2011, her 
sidewalk counseling convinced 
approximately eighty women to refrain from 
seeking abortions. 
Despite their accomplishments, the plaintiffs 
argue that the buffer zones prevent close 
personal contact with their intended 
audience and, thus, impede their ability to 
communicate effectively. By way of 
illustration, Zarrella asserts that, although 
women “always” respond to her offers of 
enlightenment and assistance, she has not 
been able to convince any of them to opt out 
of an abortion since the 2007 buffer zones 
were put in place. 
2. Worcester. The Worcester clinic is 
situated in a stand-alone building at 470 
Pleasant Street. Its main entrance is 
accessible from Pleasant Street and also 
from a private parking lot behind the 
building. The public sidewalk on Pleasant 
Street is nearly fifty-four feet from the main 
door and staggered metal fences shield the 
front of the building and the private 
pedestrian walkway that runs between these 
points. Neither the fencing nor the walkway 
is on public property. The entrance to the 
parking lot is on Dewey Street and all 
vehicular traffic must use that entrance. 
There are buffer zones marked with painted 
white arcs and posted signs on both Pleasant 
Street and Dewey Street. More than eighty-
five percent of all patients arrive by car, 
park in the clinic's lot, and walk directly to 
the main door (without setting foot on any 
public way). 
Two of the plaintiffs (Bashour and Clark) 
engage in sidewalk counseling at the 
Worcester clinic. They try to divert women 
to Problem Pregnancy, a “pro-life pregnancy 
crisis center” located across the street. 
Bashour prays quietly outside the clinic, 
sometimes alone and sometimes with others. 
For her part, Clark often displays a large 
pro-life sign. 
Here, too, the plaintiffs claim to have 
achieved some success in their counseling 
efforts. They speak with patients, distribute 
literature, and persuade women to refrain 
from seeking abortions. Notwithstanding 
these successes, the plaintiffs aver that the 
physical set-up renders their attempts to 
communicate “ineffective” by impeding 
their ability to view and approach 
individuals entering the front door, to make 
eye contact with patients, and to 
“demonstrate a caring demeanor.” As they 
recall it, virtually no patients who park in 
the clinic's private lot respond to their 
overtures or “make the effort” to venture 
outside the clinic's premises. The buffer 
zones preclude them from speaking at “a 
normal conversational distance” with, or 
placing literature near, the vast majority of 
patients entering the clinic. 
3. Springfield. The Springfield clinic is 
situated in a multi-tenant medical complex 
 458 
at the corner of Main Street and Wason 
Avenue. The building contains at least eight 
separate medical offices. It is bordered on 
two sides by private parking lots; a third side 
abuts another building; and the fourth side 
neighbors an open expanse that contains 
railroad trackage. Approximately ninety 
percent of individuals patronizing the 
complex arrive by car and park in one of the 
lots. 
There are five driveways leading to and 
from the complex, two of which have been 
painted with white arcs and posted to 
establish buffer zones: one on Main Street 
and one on Wason Avenue. The remaining 
three driveways have painted white arcs but 
no signs. They are not, therefore, buffer 
zones authorized by the Act. Consequently, 
they have no legal effect. 
A plaintiff (Shea) prays aloud and engages 
in sidewalk counseling outside the clinic. He 
habitually displays a large sign that reads 
“They're Killing Babies Here.” He laments 
that, from and after the creation of the buffer 
zones, he has not seen literature provided to 
anyone in a vehicle. He estimates that only 
five percent of those who arrive by car leave 
the clinic's parking lots either to accept pro-
life literature or to investigate the possibility 
of counseling. 
II. THE LAW OF THE CASE 
We start our appraisal of the merits with the 
plaintiffs' exhortation that we revisit 
McCullen I, in which we held that the Act, 
on its face, is a constitutionally valid time-
place-manner regulation. The district court 
found that the law of the case doctrine 
barred relitigation of this issue. We agree. 
The law of the case doctrine has two 
branches. The first, which embodies the so-
called mandate rule, “prevents relitigation in 
the trial court of matters that were explicitly 
or implicitly decided by an earlier appellate 
decision in the same case.” The second 
“binds a successor appellate panel in a 
second appeal in the same case to honor 
fully the original decision.” Both branches 
of the doctrine apply here. 
To be sure, the law of the case doctrine 
admits of certain exceptions. But the 
circumstances giving rise to those 
exceptions are narrowly circumscribed: 
A party may avoid the application of the 
law of the case doctrine only by showing 
that, in the relevant time frame, 
controlling legal authority has changed 
dramatically; or by showing that 
significant new evidence, not earlier 
obtainable in the exercise of due 
diligence, has come to light; or by 
showing that the earlier decision is 
blatantly erroneous and, if uncorrected, 
will work a miscarriage of justice. 
Although the plaintiffs allude in desultory 
fashion to the third exception, they make no 
reference to the second exception and their 
only colorable claim concerns the first 
exception. 
The plaintiffs base their claim on recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court standing for 
the wholly unremarkable proposition that 
content-based and speaker-based speech 
restrictions are disfavored. In their view, 
these neoteric decisions have so 
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reconfigured the First Amendment 
landscape as to justify a departure from the 
law of the case. This impressionistic 
argument, though ingenious, elevates hope 
over reason. The propositions for which the 
plaintiffs cite those cases are no more than 
conventional First Amendment principles 
recited by the Supreme Court in the context 
of factual scenarios far different than the 
scenario at issue here. 
The decision on which the plaintiffs rely 
most heavily—Citizens United—is 
emblematic of this point. Citizens United 
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, which had held that corporate 
entities, as opposed to other speakers, could 
be prohibited from engaging in political 
speech. The plaintiffs contend that Citizens 
United announced, for the first time, a 
blanket ban on all speaker distinctions, 
whatever the setting. This categorical ban, 
they say, should serve to invalidate the Act 
as a speaker-specific restriction. 
This is an imprecise reading of Citizens 
United. The Citizens United Court held that 
government cannot entirely prohibit 
corporate political speech. In support, it 
invoked the “central principle” laid out in 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, to 
the effect “that the First Amendment does 
not allow political speech restrictions based 
on a speaker's corporate identity.” The Act, 
of course, makes no such distinction. 
The plaintiffs, however, are undaunted. 
They seize upon an isolated statement in 
Citizens United: “Prohibited, too, are 
restrictions distinguishing among different 
speakers, allowing speech by some but not 
others.” But they yank this statement from 
its context and they neglect to mention that 
the Court cites Bellotti—a case that 
substantially predates McCullen I—for this 
proposition. The Court's reliance on Bellotti 
is not a mere fortuity. After all, the Citizens 
United Court described its decision as a 
return to classic First Amendment 
jurisprudence rather than a departure 
therefrom. The Court did not retreat from its 
well-settled abortion clinic/buffer zone 
jurisprudence. Seen in this light, we cannot 
read Citizens United as undermining the 
First Amendment foundation on which our 
rejection of the plaintiffs' facial challenge 
rested. 
So, too, Snyder, in which the Court held that 
the First Amendment precludes tort liability 
against persons who had peacefully 
protested, on public property, at the funeral 
of a Marine. Once again, the Court did no 
more than apply long-recognized First 
Amendment principles. And while it 
reiterated the special status of public streets 
as the “archetype of a traditional public 
forum,” it proceeded to confirm that even 
public fora are subject to reasonable time-
place-manner regulations. It is especially 
telling that, in making this point, the Court 
referred specifically to the abortion clinic 
buffer zone that it had upheld in Madsen.  
The plaintiffs' reliance on Sorrell is equally 
mislaid. The Sorrell Court invalidated a 
Vermont law that restricted the sale, 
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records for 
marketing purposes. The law, on its face, 
was content-based and speaker-based, and 
had been enacted with the avowed purpose 
of “diminish[ing] the effectiveness of 
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marketing by manufacturers of brand-name 
drugs.”  
The case before us could not be more 
different. As we explained in McCullen I, 
the Act is both content-neutral and speaker-
neutral. Moreover, the legislature enacted it 
to serve a valid, non-speech-related purpose: 
public safety.  
In a Rumpelstiltskin-like effort to turn straw 
into gold, the plaintiffs dismiss these 
important differences and focus instead on 
the Sorrell Court's statement that “the 
inevitable effect of a statute on its face may 
render it unconstitutional.” But this hoary 
legal precept (with which we agree) is not 
novel. The “inevitable effect” language 
derives from the Court's decision in United 
States v. O'Brien, which comfortably 
predates both our decision in McCullen I 
and the Supreme Court's abortion 
clinic/buffer zone jurisprudence. 
More to the point, the Sorrell precept is in 
no way inconsistent with our holding in 
McCullen I. The “inevitable effect” of the 
Act is to limit the communicative activities 
of all demonstrators (whether pro-choice or 
pro-life) to exactly the same extent. 
The plaintiffs have also marshaled other 
recent Supreme Court cases in their 
ambitious effort to reinvent First 
Amendment doctrine. It would serve no 
useful purpose to canvass these cases. For 
present purposes, it suffices that these 
decisions, by no stretch of even the most 
fertile imagination, sully either the reasoning 
or the doctrinal infrastructure of McCullen I. 
The short of it is that the First Amendment 
principles underpinning our core holdings in 
McCullen I have not been materially altered, 
let alone abrogated, by any subsequent 
Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the 
district court did not err in declining the 
plaintiffs' invitation to set the law of the case 
doctrine to one side and revisit the plaintiffs' 
facial challenge to the Act. 
III. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
The plaintiffs challenge the district court's 
entry of judgment on the pleadings on 
several fronts. We review de novo an order 
granting or denying judgment on the 
pleadings. To withstand a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, a “complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  
A. Viewpoint Discrimination. 
The plaintiffs' principal challenge to the 
entry of judgment on the pleadings relates to 
their claim of viewpoint discrimination. 
They argue that Planned Parenthood 
employees and agents have abused the 
buffer zones and that this activity constitutes 
viewpoint discrimination under the First 
Amendment. The district court rejected this 
argument on the pleadings, holding that the 
plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to 
support the claim.  
In their complaint, the plaintiffs aver that 
“pro-choice advocates [ ] surround, cluster, 
yell, make noise, mumble, and/or talk loudly 
to clinic clients for the purpose of disrupting 
or drowning out pro-life speech and thwart 
Plaintiffs' efforts to distribute literature.” 
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They further aver that clinic “employees 
and/or agents stand idly on the public 
sidewalks and streets inside the [buffer] 
zone”—sometimes smoking, speaking with 
each other or on mobile phones, or drinking 
coffee—“even when clinic clients are not 
present.” 
Because this issue was resolved at the 
pleading stage, we assume arguendo that the 
raw facts are as the plaintiffs have alleged. 
The question remains, however, whether the 
depicted conduct can fairly be characterized 
as viewpoint discrimination attributable to 
the state. The plaintiffs say that it can. The 
Attorney General demurs. 
We begin with the basics. The Act, on its 
face, is viewpoint-neutral. Although it 
contains a “clinic employee” exemption, that 
exemption does not purport to allow either 
advocacy by an exempt person or 
interference by an exempt person with the 
advocacy of others. 
The plaintiffs strive mightily to overcome 
this obstacle. They call our attention to the 
decision in Hoye v. City of Oakland. There, 
a municipal ordinance prohibited, within a 
100–foot zone around entrances to RHCFs, 
any knowing or willful “approach within 
eight feet of an individual seeking entry to 
the clinic if one's purpose in approaching 
that person is to engage in conversation, 
protest, counseling, or various other forms 
of speech.” The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the ordinance was constitutional on its face 
but unconstitutional as applied. It predicated 
this conclusion on a determination that the 
city did not evenly enforce the ordinance; 
rather, the city's actions manifested “a firm 
policy of enforcing the Ordinance ... only 
[against] efforts to persuade women 
approaching [RHCFs] ... not to receive 
abortions or other reproductive health 
services, and not [against] communications 
seeking to encourage entry into the clinic for 
the purpose of undergoing treatment.”  
This case is at a considerable remove from 
Hoye. The Hoye court's finding of uneven 
enforcement was inevitable in light of the 
city's frank admission that it consciously 
“enforces the Ordinance in a content-
discriminatory manner.” In contrast, the 
plaintiffs here have not pleaded any facts 
that might suffice to ground a claim of 
uneven enforcement. 
The conduct described, without more, has 
nothing to do with the First Amendment. 
While loitering in a buffer zone by an 
exempt person is not expressive in nature 
and arguably does not serve the purposes of 
the Act, such conduct, simpliciter, does not 
prefer one viewpoint over another. 
What is more, the employees and agents 
about whom the plaintiffs complain are not 
state actors but—unlike the municipal police 
officers in Hoye—are agents of a private 
entity (Planned Parenthood). The Act allows 
these individuals to be in buffer zones under 
the clinic employee exemption. But to the 
extent that they have tried to use their 
exempt status either to advocate a particular 
point of view or to drown out the plaintiffs' 
message, there is no allegation that such 
behavior has been sanctioned by the state. 
Another point is worth making. If the 
plaintiffs believed themselves to be 
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aggrieved by the employee/agent behavior 
that they describe, the commonsense remedy 
would have been to complain to police 
officers or other state authorities. The 
pleadings are barren of any allegation that 
such a complaint was ever made. 
The bottom line is that, to be cognizable, a 
claim of uneven enforcement requires state 
action. Whatever actions the clinic 
employees and agents may have taken, this 
record reveals no basis for a plausible claim 
that those actions reflect a viewpoint 
preference of the state.  
B. Overbreadth. 
The plaintiffs assign error to the district 
court's entry of judgment on the pleadings 
with respect to their overbreadth claim. 
Although they concede that we rejected a 
substantially similar overbreadth claim in 
McCullen I, they suggest that the Act may 
be overbroad in particular applications. 
Overbreadth doctrine invalidates statutes 
“not because [the plaintiffs'] own rights of 
free expression are violated, but because of a 
judicial prediction or assumption that the 
statute's very existence may cause others not 
before the court to refrain from 
constitutionally protected speech or 
expression.” But overbreadth must be both 
“real” and “substantial,” as assessed “in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep.” “Where an overbreadth attack is 
successful, the statute is obviously invalid in 
all its applications, since every person to 
whom it is applied can defend on the basis 
of the same overbreadth.” Thus, the 
appropriate  analysis “requires consideration 
of many more applications than those 
immediately before the court.”  
In the case at hand, the parties spar over 
whether there is such a creature as an as-
applied overbreadth challenge. We need not 
grapple with this conundrum because, even 
if some overbreadth challenges may contain 
an as-applied component, this one does not. 
In explaining the district court's supposed 
error, the plaintiffs repeat their complaint, 
rejected on their facial challenge, that all 
communicative activities (as opposed to, 
say, purely violent or aggressive activities) 
are banned within buffer zones. In 
attempting to convert this previously 
rejected challenge into a viable as-applied 
challenge, they posit that McCullen I cannot 
control because it did not specifically 
conclude whether the Act is substantially 
overbroad at the Boston, Worcester, and 
Springfield locations. Withal, they offer no 
accompanying factual allegations, other than 
pointing to what they identify as five buffer 
zones at the Springfield location. As we 
already have explained, only two 
enforceable buffer zones exist around the 
Springfield clinic. Thus, our Springfield-
directed analysis considers only those two 
zones. 
We need not tarry. Here, as in Hill, “the 
comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, 
not a vice, because it is evidence against 
there being a discriminatory governmental 
motive.” The plaintiffs have not pleaded 
facts sufficient to suggest that our earlier 
holding in McCullen I does not control their 
present claim. Accordingly, the claim fails 
under the plausibility standard. It follows 
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that the district court did not err in granting 
judgment on the pleadings on the 
overbreadth claim. 
C. Other Claims. 
The plaintiffs attempt to resurrect a number 
of other claims that the district court laid to 
rest in its entry of judgment on the 
pleadings. There are two principal problems. 
First, the plaintiffs have not pleaded an 
adequate factual predicate. In the absence of 
pleaded facts sufficient to distinguish the 
plaintiffs' as-applied challenge on these 
grounds from their failed facial challenge, 
the latter controls the former.  
Second, the plaintiffs do not pursue this 
battery of claims with developed 
argumentation or in any other meaningful 
way. We routinely have held, and today 
reaffirm, that theories presented on appeal in 
a perfunctory fashion are deemed 
abandoned. So it is here. 
IV. THE AS–APPLIED CHALLENGE 
We turn next to the red meat of this appeal: 
the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge to the 
operation of the Act at the three specific 
RHCFs described above. The district court 
spurned this challenge; it concluded that 
because there are adequate alternative 
channels of communication open to the 
plaintiffs at each location, the Act comprises 
a valid time-place-manner regulation. We 
review this conclusion de novo.  
With respect to time-place-manner 
regulations, the Supreme Court has 
explained: 
[E]ven in a public forum the government 
may impose reasonable restrictions on 
the time, place, or manner of protected 
speech, provided the restrictions are 
justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they 
leave open ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information. 
The district court found that the issues of 
content neutrality and narrow tailoring were 
definitively resolved by McCullen I. The 
plaintiffs lament that this approach 
“improperly narrowed the required 
constitutional analysis.” 
We reject this lamentation. The facts 
proffered by the plaintiffs in support of their 
as-applied challenge do not raise new or 
different issues but, rather, repeat in relevant 
part the same fact patterns envisioned in our 
adjudication of their failed facial challenge. 
It is black-letter law that a plaintiff cannot 
rewardingly prosecute an as-applied 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute 
based on the same legal arguments and 
factual predicate that underpinned an earlier 
(unsuccessful) facial challenge.  
The congruence between the plaintiffs' facial 
and as-applied challenges cannot be 
gainsaid. The plaintiffs now attempt to raise 
precisely the same arguments about content 
neutrality and the significance of the 
governmental interest involved that were 
squarely raised (and squarely repulsed) in 
the course of their facial challenge. The 
same can be said of the narrow tailoring 
inquiry. In any event, to the extent that the 
as-applied challenge in this case implicates 
particularities of the three clinic locations, 
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those particularities are swept into—and 
appropriately addressed by—the inquiry into 
the availability of adequate alternative 
means of communication.  
This brings us to the pivotal question of 
whether the Act, as applied, leaves open 
adequate alternative means of 
communication. Each of the plaintiffs 
engages in communicative activities outside 
one of the three designated RHCFs. 
According to the plaintiffs, these 
communicative activities are intended to 
influence individuals seeking or considering 
abortions as well as “those who approve or 
perform abortions.” 
The plaintiffs vouchsafe that they prefer to 
communicate their message through up-
close, gentle conversations, accompanied by 
smiles and eye contact. They insist that the 
buffer zones authorized by the Act force 
them to engage in shorter, louder, and less 
personal exchanges. They fear that, without 
the ability to “make eye contact and 
demonstrate a caring demeanor,” their 
communications are ineffectual. As they see 
it, the need to stop at the edge of the buffer 
zone is devastating; this restriction compels 
them to raise their voices, precludes them 
from handing literature to prospective 
patients in many instances, detracts from 
their message, and somehow makes them 
seem “untrustworthy.” 
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' 
importunings, the court below concluded 
that adequate alternative means of 
communication exist at all three sites. Our 
inquiry focuses on this set of conclusions. 
The record makes plain that communicative 
activities flourish at all three places. To 
begin, the plaintiffs and their placards are 
visible to their intended audience. Through 
their signs and demonstrations, the plaintiffs 
disseminate their message and elicit 
audience reactions. Their voices are audible. 
They have the option (which they sometimes 
have exercised) of using sound amplification 
equipment. When they and their cohorts 
deem it useful to do so, they congregate in 
groups outside a clinic, engage in spoken 
prayer, employ symbols (such as crucifixes 
and baby caskets), and wear evocative 
garments. They sometimes don costumes 
(dressing up as, say, the Grim Reaper). 
To be sure, the Act curtails the plaintiffs' 
ability to carry on gentle discussions with 
prospective patients at a conversational 
distance, embellished with eye contact and 
smiles. But as long as a speaker has an 
opportunity to reach her intended audience, 
the Constitution does not ensure that she 
always will be able to employ her preferred 
method of communication. In the last 
analysis, “there is no constitutional 
requirement that demonstrators be granted ... 
particularized access” to their desired 
audience. As long as adequate alternative 
means of communication exist, the First 
Amendment is not infringed. 
Our inquiry into the adequacy of alternative 
means of communication is, of course, site-
specific. At the Boston clinic, all prospective 
patients must traverse a public sidewalk to 
gain entry. Given this reality, many channels 
of communication remain available to the 
plaintiffs. Those alternative channels are 
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adequate to offset the restrictions inherent in 
the buffer zones. 
The analysis is somewhat different with 
respect to Worcester and Springfield. At 
these sites, it is not the buffer zones that 
constitute the main impediment to 
communicative activity; instead, it is the 
prospective patients' unwillingness to 
venture off the clinics' private property. 
Most prospective patients arrive by car, park 
in private lots, and use non-public walkways 
to enter the facility. The fact that these 
patients are not readily accessible to the 
plaintiffs is more a function of the physical 
characteristics of the sites than of the 
operation of the Act. 
This is a critically important datum. The law 
does not require that a patient run a public-
sidewalk gauntlet before entering an 
abortion clinic. That patients choose to stay 
on private property or not to stop their cars 
on approach is a matter of patient volition, 
not an invidious effect of the Act. First 
Amendment rights do not guarantee to the 
plaintiffs (or anyone else, for that matter) an 
interested, attentive, and receptive audience, 
available at close-range. 
One additional observation seems 
appropriate. In the context of abortion-
related demonstrations, the Supreme Court 
has specifically recognized the interest of 
clinic patients both “in avoiding unwanted 
communication” and “pass[ing] without 
obstruction.” Consistent with this interest, 
the First Amendment does not compel 
prospective patients seeking to enter an 
abortion clinic to make any special effort to 
expose themselves to the cacophony of 
political protests. Nor does it guarantee to 
the plaintiffs the same quantum of 
communication that would exist in the total 
absence of regulation. A diminution in the 
amount of speech, in and of itself, does not 
translate into unconstitutionality. So long as 
adequate alternative means of 
communication exist, no more is 
constitutionally exigible. 
We add a coda. Even if the plaintiffs' 
audience is diminished in some respects by 
the existence of the buffer zones, that 
diminution is not constitutionally fatal. The 
fact that a regulation “may reduce to some 
degree the potential audience for [the 
plaintiffs'] speech is of no consequence,” as 
long as adequate alternative means of 
communication exist.  
In an effort to change the trajectory of the 
debate, the plaintiffs tout the Supreme 
Court's decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo. 
That decision is inapposite here. 
Gilleo involved a municipal ordinance that 
broadly banned residential signs. Analyzing 
the ordinance as a time-place-manner 
regulation, the Court assumed the validity of 
the city's content-neutral justification and 
acknowledged its valid governmental 
interest in limiting “visual clutter.” But the 
Court took account of the peculiar 
characteristics of home-lawn signs and the 
“special respect for individual liberty in the 
home” and concluded that the ordinance 
failed to leave open adequate alternative 
means of communication. Of particular 
pertinence for present purposes, the Court 
explicitly contrasted the home-lawn sign 
context with “the government's need to 
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mediate among various competing uses, 
including expressive ones, for public 
streets.” The case at hand falls solidly within 
the latter context and, thus, outside Gilleo's 
precedential sweep. 
One further point must be made. The 
decision in Gilleo predates the Court's 
abortion clinic/buffer zone line of cases. The 
Court's majority in these cases never even 
mentions Gilleo. It would make no sense to 
wrest Gilleo from its contextual moorings 
and use it as a wedge to subvert the Court's 
later decisions addressed to the much 
different problem of how the First 
Amendment operates when the special 
concerns of public-sidewalk protests around 
abortion clinics are at stake. 
We summarize succinctly. On this record, it 
is readily apparent that, notwithstanding the 
buffer zones authorized by the Act, adequate 
communicative channels remain available to 
the plaintiffs, including oral speech of 
varying degrees of volume and 
amplification, distribution of literature, 
displays of signage and symbols, wearing of 
evocative garments and costumes, and 
prayer alone and in groups. The Act is, 
therefore, a valid time-place-manner 
regulation as applied to the Boston, 
Worcester, and Springfield RHCFs. 
V. LEAVE TO AMEND 
In a last-ditch effort to save the day, the 
plaintiffs asseverate that the district court 
erred in denying them leave to amend their 
complaint to include a direct challenge to 
the Attorney General's letter. We review for 
abuse of discretion a district court's denial of 
a motion to amend a complaint. As a general 
proposition, a denial of a motion for leave to 
amend “will be upheld so long as the record 
evinces an arguably adequate basis for the 
court's decision,” such as “futility, bad faith, 
undue delay, or a dilatory motive on the 
movant's part.”  
The order challenged in this case falls within 
the rubric of undue delay. The district court 
took a balanced approach. It allowed the 
plaintiffs to make amendments at the 
margins of their complaint (for example, the 
addition of the three district attorney 
defendants), but it refused to allow the 
plaintiffs to introduce a new theme at so late 
a date. 
The plaintiffs' original complaint focused 
exclusively on the Act. The Attorney 
General issued the guidance letter within 
two weeks of the filing of the complaint, yet 
the plaintiffs chose to ignore it. Not until 
September 17, 2010 did the plaintiffs seek to 
enlarge their target to include the Attorney 
General's letter. That was more than two-
and-one-half years after the docketing of 
their original complaint. They have offered 
no compelling explanation for the delay. 
Given the passage of this inordinate period 
of time, we cannot say that the district court 
abused its discretion in drawing the line and 
refusing to allow the plaintiffs to refocus 
their attack. The plaintiffs had ample time to 
get their ducks in a row, and the district 
court was under no obligation to give them 
more. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
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We need go no further. For the reasons 
elucidated above, we affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
Affirmed. 
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“Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Gets U.S. High Court Review” 
Bloomberg 
Greg Stohr 
June 24, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted a case 
that promises to redefine the speech rights of 
abortion opponents, agreeing to rule on a 
Massachusetts law that creates a 35-foot 
buffer zone around clinic entrances. 
The justices today said they will hear an 
appeal from abortion foes seeking to 
overturn the Massachusetts law as a 
violation of the First Amendment. The 
challengers say they have a right to hand out 
leaflets and start conversations with women 
entering abortion clinics. 
A Boston-based federal appeals court upheld 
the measure, pointing to a 2000 Supreme 
Court decision that upheld Colorado 
restrictions on abortion clinic protests. 
Massachusetts enacted the law in 2007, 
strengthening an existing measure that had 
required a 6-foot buffer zone at abortion 
clinics. The new law makes it a crime to 
“knowingly enter or remain” in an area 
within 35 feet of a clinic entrance, exit or 
driveway. The measure exempts clinic 
employees and people entering or leaving 
the facility. 
The high court’s membership has changed 
significantly since the 2000 decision. Most 
notably, two members of that 6-3 majority, 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, are no longer on the 
court. Their successors, Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, are often 
sympathetic to free-speech claims. 
The justices will hear arguments and rule in 
their 2013-14 term, which starts in October. 
The case is McCullen v. Coakley, 12-1168. 
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“McCullen v. Coakley: Abortion Is Heading to the Supreme Court Again” 
PolicyMic 
Alexandra Ma 
June 18, 2013 
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear out a challenge from anti-abortion 
activists. This time, it is not about the 
mothers or their wombs, but about the 
freedom of speech. 
The challenge from seven anti-abortion 
petitioners is directed at the Massachusetts 
abortion clinic buffer law that was enacted 
in 2000, which bans demonstrations within 
35 feet of entrances and driveways of 
abortion clinics. The petitioners claim that 
the Massachusetts law discriminately 
violates their First and Fourteenth 
Amendments; in their petition to the 
Supreme Court, they write that "The law 
restricts the speech of only those who wish 
to use public areas near abortion clinics to 
speak about abortion from a different point 
of view." 
The petitioners are backed by anti-abortion 
activists, many of whom offer "sidewalk 
counseling" to women on their way to the 
clinics. They claim that the law unfairly 
keeps them from engaging patients in 
conversation at a closer distance. Similarly, 
Philip Moran, the petitioners' lawyers, said, 
"You can't stand outside 35 feet and 
communicate with people ... You have to 
have eye contact." 
The Massachusetts buffer zone laws were 
established after a tragic attack was carried 
out in 1994 outside an abortion clinic in 
Brookline, Massachusetts, when abortion 
opponent John C. Salvi III shot two clinic 
workers to death and wounded five others. 
Many legal challenges had been rejected 
prior to this case, but they were revived in 
2007 when Governor Deval Patrick signed a 
bill extending the buffer zone from 18 to 35 
feet. 
In 2008, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the law in its ruling in McCullen v. 
Coakley, stating that the law upholds both 
free speech and abortion patients' rights. The 
First Circuit acknowledged, "The nation is 
sharply divided about the morality of the 
practice and its place in a caring society ... 
But the right of the state to take reasonable 
steps to ensure the safe passage of persons 
wishing to enter health care facilities cannot 
seriously be questioned." 
Speaking since the Supreme Court's grant of 
a writ of certiorari on Monday, 
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha 
Coakley reiterated her belief that the law 
"ensure[s] a women's right to safe access to 
health care facilities while preserving First 
Amendment rights... We look forward to 
defending this vitally important legislation 
before the Supreme Court." 
Equally hopeful are the anti-abortion 
activists, who believe that the buffer zone 
laws are a "clear case of viewpoint 
discrimination." Executive director of the 
Life Legal Defense Foundation Dana Cody 
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also expressed her optimism that the 
Supreme Court will not only overturn the 
law, "but also revisit some of its own prior 
precedents that led lower courts to believe 
that, as a matter of law, pro-life speech is 
less deserving of protection." Moran also 
mentioned that he and his clients were 
"delighted" that SCOTUS agreed to hear 
their case. "We think we have a good shot," 
he said on Monday. 
In the past, SCOTUS has rejected a number 
of cases, most notably from Indiana and 
Colorado, which would have effectively 
reopened the debate on abortion, so their 
reason for reopening McCullen would be 
interesting to explore. Given the optimism 
from both sides of the case, SCOTUS's 
decision is not going to be easily 
predictable. 
On one hand, given SCOTUS's sympathetic 
stance towards abortion-seekers, this hearing 
may serve as a once-and-for-all ruling that 
upholds McCullen, thereby setting a 
precedent for lower courts to allow buffer 
zones protecting women who seek abortion. 
On the other hand, SCOTUS may strengthen 
the scope of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, allowing anti-abortion 
activists to exercise their freedom of speech 
anytime, anywhere. 
So, watch this space. Given the fine line 
between protecting abortion seekers' rights 
and the fundamental freedoms provided by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, this 
is definitely another SCOTUS judgment for 
which we should keep our eyes peeled. 
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“Court Upholds Mass. Abortion Clinic Buffer Law” 
Boston Globe 
Martin Finucane 
January 9, 2013 
A federal appeals court has again upheld the 
buffer zone law for Massachusetts abortion 
clinics, saying that the regulation protects 
the rights of patients while, at the same time, 
allowing others to express their opinions. 
“Few subjects have proven more 
controversial in modern times than the issue 
of abortion,” the US Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit said in its ruling on 
Wednesday. “The nation is sharply divided 
about the morality of the practice and its 
place in a caring society. But the right of the 
state to take reasonable steps to ensure the 
safe passage of persons wishing to enter 
health care facilities cannot seriously be 
questioned. 
“The Massachusetts statute at issue here is a 
content-neutral, narrowly tailored time-
place-manner regulation that protects the 
rights of prospective patients and clinic 
employees without offending the First 
Amendment rights of others,” said the 
opinion, written by Judge Bruce M. Selya, 
who heard the case, along with two other 
judges. 
The appeals court ruling affirmed a decision 
by US District Judge Joseph L. Tauro last 
February. 
Mark L. Rienzi, a lawyer representing the 
plaintiffs, said they expected to appeal the 
decision to the US Supreme Court. 
“The same rules have to apply to all 
speakers. The government cannot put 
peaceful pro-life speakers in jail, but give 
Planned Parenthood free rein on the same 
sidewalk,” he said in a statement. 
The law creates a 35-foot fixed buffer zone 
around the driveways and entrances of 
clinics. The lawsuit, Eleanor McCullen et al 
v. Martha Coakley et al, was brought by 
seven people who regularly engaged in 
antiabortion counseling outside the three 
clinics. 
“We are pleased that the court has once 
again upheld the Commonwealth’s buffer 
zone law which provides safe access to 
reproductive health care facilities while 
preserving freedom of expression,” Attorney 
General Martha Coakley, whose office 
defended the law, said in a statement. “We 
have always believed, and the court agreed, 
that the buffer zone leaves open the 
opportunity for civil engagement on public 
areas around these facilities while ensuring 
that patients and health care providers can 
safely access these facilities.” 
The challenge to the law was the latest in a 
series. “This case does not come to us as a 
stranger,” the appeals court said, leading off 
its decision. 
The court twice upheld an earlier version of 
the law, in 2001 and 2004. After the 
Legislature revised the law in 2007, the 
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appeals court upheld it again in 2009. More 
challenges were launched in Tauro’s court. 
Tauro rejected them, but the plaintiffs 
appealed, leading to the court’s decision 
today. 
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“Abortion Opponents: 'Buffer Zones' At Abortion Clinics Violate Free 
Speech” 
US News 
Elizabeth Flock 
June 25, 2013 
The Supreme Court has said it will 
reconsider the constitutionality of protest 
zones 
The Supreme Court announced Monday it 
would hear an appeal from abortion 
opponents on the constitutionality of a 2007 
Massachusetts law that requires protesters to 
stand at least 35 feet from abortion 
clinics, according to the Associated Press. 
Chief among those opponents is the 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, an anti-
abortion group that's been challenging the 
law for years as a violation of their free 
speech rights. 
"We consider it a First Amendment issue, 
because it's a law that targets very certain 
facilities, just abortion facilities," says Anne 
Fox, the group's president. Protests outside 
corporate buildings or by animal rights 
activists, for example, do not have protests 
"buffer zones." Fox says the zones also 
make it nearly impossible for anti-abortion 
activists to speak freely to women walking 
into clinics to get an abortion. 
"At many [clinics] people would like to 
counsel a woman who would like to know 
her options... and this law makes it 
extremely difficult. You don't want to yell at 
someone, but you really can't get near 
them," she says. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life also works 
online to persuade women away from 
abortions; its website's homepage reads: 
"Pregnant? Need Help?" and leads to a list 
of Christian missions in Massachusetts that 
provide counseling on how to avoid an 
abortion. 
State lawmakers first approved the law for 
protest zones in 2000, motivated in part by 
fears of violence at abortion clinics. Just 
several years prior, an abortion opponent, 
John Salvi, had walked into two Boston-area 
Planned Parenthood reproductive health 
clinics and opened fire, killing two 
receptionists and wounding five more. 
"People seeking health services should be 
able to do so without fear of violence, 
harassment or intimidation," Planned 
Parenthood League of Massachusetts 
President Martha Walz said in a released 
statement Monday. 
But Fox says she doesn't believe buffer 
zones can effectively prevent violence at 
clinics. 
"If you're going to have violence, a 35-foot 
buffer zone wouldn't help. The only people 
abiding this are the peaceful protesters," she 
says. "And there are probably four incidents 
of violence at abortion clinics a year. It's 
much less likely to have violence at a clinic 
than at a McDonalds." 
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According to the National Abortion 
Federation (NAF), which tracks anti-
abortion attacks, abortion clinics have seen 
less than four attacks per year for the last 
several years. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, which is 
optimistic the Supreme Court will strike 
down the buffer zone law, has had success at 
the highest court before. 
In 1978, the Federal Election Commission 
questioned whether corporate donations had 
helped the group print 100,000 pamphlets 
calling out the pro-abortion voting records 
of candidates. The case went to the Supreme 
Court, which ruled in favor of 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, saying a 
ban on corporate electoral spending was 
unconstitutional. 
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Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice 
12-1094 
Ruling Below: Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27 (Okla. 2012), 
cert granted, 2013 WL 867379 (U.S. 2013). 
Coalition of reproductive rights organizations brought action challenging constitutionality of 
state statute prohibiting prescription of abortifacient medication. The District Court held statute 
unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement thereof. State appealed.  
Question Presented: Whether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibits: (1) 
the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with 
mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the 
use of methotrexate to treat eptopic pregnancies. Further proceedings in this case are reserved 
pending receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 
 
 
OKLAHOMA COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, on behalf of itself and its 
members and Nova Health Systems, d/b/a Reproductive Services, on behalf of itself, its 
staff, and its patients, Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
Terry CLINE, in his official capacity as Oklahoma Commissioner of Health, Lyle Kelsey, 
in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Oklahoma State Board of Medical 
Licensure and Supervision, Catherine V. Taylor, in her official capacity as the President of 
the Oklahoma State Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Defendants/Appellants. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
Decided on December 4, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
Per curiam 
This is an appeal of the trial court's 
summary judgment which held House Bill 
1970, unconstitutional. Upon review of the 
record and the briefs of the parties, this 
Court determines this matter is controlled by 
the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which was 
applied in this Court's recent decision of In 
re Initiative No. 395. 
Because the United States Supreme Court 
has previously determined the dispositive 
issue presented in this matter, this Court is 
not free to impose its own view of the law. 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
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made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
The Oklahoma Constitution reaffirms the 
effect of the Supremacy Clause on 
Oklahoma law by providing: “The State of 
Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union, and the Constitution of the 
United States is the supreme law of the 
land.” Thus, this Court is duty bound by the 
United States and the Oklahoma 
Constitutions to “follow the mandate of the 
United States Supreme Court on matters of 
federal constitutional law”  
The challenged measure is facially 
unconstitutional pursuant to Casey. The 
mandate of Casey remains binding on this 
Court until and unless the United States 
Supreme Court holds to the contrary. The 
judgment of the trial court holding the 
enactment unconstitutional is affirmed and 
the measure is stricken in its entirety. 
ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. 
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“Supreme Court tells Oklahoma to Review Abortion Pill Law” 
Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
June 27, 2013 
The Supreme Court told the high court of 
Oklahoma on Thursday to clarify a new 
state law restricting the use of the RU-486 
abortion pill, setting the stage for a possible 
future ruling on how far states can go in 
regulating the practice of abortion. 
Legislators in several states, including 
Oklahoma, have passed laws to strictly 
regulate the practice of abortion. Among 
them are measures that require all women 
seeking abortions to undergo an ultrasound 
test. Oklahoma also adopted a law 
restricting the use of RU-486. 
But the Oklahoma Supreme Court blocked 
these laws from taking effect, saying they 
conflicted with a 1992 Supreme Court 
decision on abortion. 
The justices, in their last meeting until late 
September, granted in part an appeal from 
Oklahoma Atty. Gen. Scott Pruitt on 
Thursday, but then sent the case back to 
Oklahoma for the state court to further 
explain how the RU-486 law would work in 
practice. 
The court’s action will put off consideration 
of the issue until the state court acts. 
At issue ultimately is the meaning of the 
high court’s 1992 decision in Planned 
Parenthood vs. Casey, which upheld a 
woman’s right to choose abortion, but said 
states may regulate the practice, so long as 
they do not put an “undue burden” on the 
patients or their doctors. 
The justices did not closely define what 
regulations were permitted, and they have 
largely stood aside since then. Their only 
major abortion ruling in recent years upheld 
the federal law that prohibited late-term 
abortions. 
Besides Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas and 
North Carolina have adopted laws requiring 
women to undergo ultrasound tests for 
nearly all abortions, even if they and their 
doctor object. 
The two sides in the Oklahoma case differ 
sharply on the law regulating mifepristone, 
or RU-486. The state says it wants doctors 
and patients to follow the federal guidelines 
in using the drug. State lawmakers said they 
were seeking to protect the health of women. 
Lawyers for the Center for Reproductive 
Rights said the regulations, if put into effect, 
would prevent women from using the 
abortion pill. “The statute at issue here 
effectively bans all abortions using 
medication, rather than by surgery,” they 
told the high court. 
  
 478 
“Abortion-Drug Case on Docket for Now” 
Wall Street Journal 
Louise Radnofsky & Brent Kendall 
June 27, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday 
expressed interest in examining an 
Oklahoma law restricting the use of 
abortion-inducing drugs, raising the prospect 
of a ruling on an increasingly prevalent form 
of abortion. 
The high court hasn't previously considered 
what kind of rules on drug-induced 
abortions might pass constitutional scrutiny. 
In the 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling and 
subsequent decisions modifying it, the 
Supreme Court has said women have a right 
to an abortion, while upholding certain state 
restrictions, such as waiting-period 
requirements. 
The justices announced in a short written 
order that they would review the Oklahoma 
case, but added an asterisk: Before the court 
would move forward, it wished to hear the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court's views on how 
the state's law works. That left open the 
possibility that the high court could delay 
action or drop the case altogether after the 
Oklahoma court responds. 
The appeal before the Supreme Court 
centers largely on RU-486, which was 
approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in 2000 for use in 
terminating pregnancies. 
Abortion-rights supporters say the drug and 
others like it expand women's access to 
abortion, because they are cheaper and less 
invasive than surgical abortions, can be 
taken privately and can be made available in 
areas where there are few or no abortion 
providers. 
An Oklahoma law requires doctors to use 
FDA protocol when they administer RU-486 
and other abortion-inducing drugs. The law's 
challengers—an abortion-rights group and a 
medical clinic—said in court documents that 
the state law effectively bans all abortions 
performed using the medication because 
doctors have developed better methods for 
administering the drugs that don't follow the 
original FDA protocol. 
After Oklahoma enacted the law in 2011, 
state courts struck it down as 
unconstitutional, prompting Oklahoma 
Attorney General E. Scott Pruitt to appeal to 
the U.S. Supreme Court in a bid to save the 
measure. 
Mr. Pruitt said the state was trying to protect 
women from off-label use of abortion-
inducing drugs, which Oklahoma officials 
say has led to eight deaths. Oklahoma says it 
isn't trying to ban drug-induced abortions 
outright. 
"We look forward to the opportunity to 
defend Oklahoma's right to protect its 
citizens," Mr. Pruitt said. 
Antiabortion activists praised the high 
court's indication it would consider the 
issue. "The Supreme Court has taken a first 
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step toward protecting women and girls 
from the abortion industry's callous 
disregard for their health and safety when 
using life-ending drugs," said Charmaine 
Yoest, president of Americans United for 
Life. 
Abortion-rights supporters say state 
restrictions on the drugs may tie doctors' 
hands and pose an undue burden on access 
to abortion. "This method has clearly been 
under attack," said Morgan Meneses-Sheets, 
program manager of the Reproductive 
Health Technologies Project. "Our 
opponents have been very creative and 
successful at carving away access." 
Some 39 states require abortion-inducing 
drugs to be prescribed by a licensed 
physician. Four states—Arizona, North 
Dakota, Ohio and Oklahoma—have passed 
laws restricting physicians to follow the 
FDA protocol. 
Twelve states have required the prescribing 
physician to be present when the drug is 
taken, barring the use of telephones or video 
conferencing, although not all of those laws 
are currently in effect. 
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“The Next Abortion Case is Here” 
The New York Times 
Linda Greenhouse 
September 4, 2013 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, author of the 
5-to-4 opinion in June that struck down the 
Defense of Marriage Act, may well be a 
hero to the gay rights community, and 
deservedly so. But he’s also the author of 
the 5-to-4 opinion that upheld the federal 
ban on so-called partial birth abortion back 
in 2007, and abortion-rights advocates have 
viewed with something close to dread the 
prospect that he could play a similarly 
decisive role in the Supreme Court’s next 
abortion case. 
That case has arrived. 
It’s understandable if you haven’t heard of 
Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for 
Reproductive Justice, which has received 
relatively little attention since the court 
accepted it on June 27, the day after the term 
ended. The lack of attention is itself 
understandable. 
The case is an appeal by the state of 
Oklahoma from a ruling by its Supreme 
Court striking down a law that limits 
doctors’ ability to prescribe the pills used to 
terminate early pregnancies. The medical 
abortion regimen, often referred to as RU-
486, was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in 2000 as a safe and 
effective alternative to surgical abortion 
early in the first trimester. It has been used 
since then by close to two million American 
women, currently about 200,000 a year out 
of some 1.2 million abortions performed 
annually. The Oklahoma law doesn’t ban the 
medical procedure. Rather, it requires 
doctors to follow the dosage and other 
instructions on the F.D.A. label. Viewed 
outside its context in the battle over 
abortion, the law looks perfectly sensible, a 
routine state regulation of medical practice. 
(Spoiler alert: it isn’t.) 
Further muddying the waters, the case is 
procedurally messy. While accepting it, the 
justices deferred scheduling it for argument 
until they receive clarification from the state 
court about what medications the somewhat 
ambiguously worded statute applies to. A 
request to another court for clarification, 
known as a certified question, is not 
unheard-of at the Supreme Court, but it is 
unusual. It gives the court’s order granting 
review a tentative look, as if the justices are 
less than fully committed to deciding the 
case. It’s possible that after receiving the 
state court’s answer (there is no deadline, 
but the state court has invited briefs from 
interested groups and is likely to hear 
argument in October), the justices will 
decide not to proceed. 
Possible but not, I think, likely. This case 
simply presents too tempting a target, for the 
very reasons that lie behind the emergence 
of this seemingly technical dispute about 
medical practice. At issue is the Supreme 
Court’s own unstable abortion doctrine, 
specifically on where five justices might be 
willing to draw a line between acceptable 
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and impermissible obstacles to access to 
abortion. 
While not everything about the case is clear 
yet, one aspect is perfectly obvious: the 
court’s grant of review was no casual matter. 
Some justice or group of justices (it takes 
four votes to accept a case) spotted this case 
as a potential vehicle for saying something 
bigger about abortion and its regulation. By 
the same token, it’s no accident that medical 
abortion (or medication abortion, as it is also 
known) is the latest flash point in the 
abortion debate. That may be 
counterintuitive, given the prolonged hand-
wringing over “partial-birth” and other 
“late-term” abortions; medical abortion is 
most effective in the first six or seven weeks 
of pregnancy (by which time the embryo is 
about the size of a pencil eraser) and doesn’t 
work after nine weeks (still in the first 
trimester, which is when about 90 percent of 
all abortions take place). 
But if you think about it, it’s evident why 
opponents of abortion have begun to focus 
on the early nonsurgical procedure. Medical 
abortion is the ultimate in women’s 
reproductive empowerment and personal 
privacy. All it takes are two pills: 
mifepristone, sold as Mifeprex, which 
blocks the hormone progesterone, without 
which a pregnancy can’t continue, and 
misoprostol, taken two days later, which 
causes the uterus to contract and expel the 
early pregnancy. In many states, women can 
take the second pill at home. 
As abortion clinics are forced to close 
because of onerous state regulations (54 
clinics in 27 states have closed in the last 
three years, and many women live hundreds 
of miles from the nearest provider) and as 
women entering clinics often have to run a 
gauntlet of protesters seeking to “counsel” 
them (in its new term, the Supreme Court 
will hear a First Amendment challenge to a 
Massachusetts “bubble zone” law that keeps 
speakers 35 feet away from the entrance to a 
“reproductive health care facility”), medical 
abortion offers an end-run around the 
obstacles that for years have been a core part 
of opposition strategy. 
That’s why, for example, 17 states have 
recently passed laws or issued regulations 
barring doctors from using video 
conferencing — “telemedicine” — to 
prescribe the abortion pills. Although video 
conferencing is increasingly popular in other 
medical settings, abortion is the only context 
in which states have sought to ban it. For a 
medical abortion, a nurse examines the 
woman by ultrasound as the doctor views 
the results over a video link. Having 
determined the stage of the pregnancy, the 
doctor then advises the woman on what to 
expect from the medication and dispenses 
the pills by sending a command that opens a 
drawer in the office. After taking the 
sequence of pills, the woman returns two 
weeks later for a follow-up visit. 
Some 8,000 women in Iowa have used this 
procedure, which was pioneered in the state 
by Planned Parenthood and authorized in 
2011 by the Iowa Board of Medicine. The 
board reversed itself last week. It acted on a 
petition from anti-abortion groups and with 
the support of Gov. Terry Branstad, an 
abortion opponent whose appointees to the 
board include a Catholic priest, Msgr. Frank 
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Bognanno. Governor Branstad’s declaration 
that the video ban will “protect the health 
and well-being of Iowa women” had a 
familiar ring. Protecting women is always 
the stated rationale for new restrictions on 
abortion, even when the rationale is — as in 
Iowa, and as in the Oklahoma case before 
the Supreme Court — hogwash. 
The law at issue in the Supreme Court case 
wasn’t drafted in Oklahoma. It was written 
in Chicago by an influential anti-abortion 
organization, Americans United for Life, 
and included as the “Abortion-Inducing 
Drugs Safety Act” among 30 model laws 
made available for sponsorship by state 
legislators. In the name of patient safety, the 
statute makes it a crime for doctors to 
deviate from the dosage and other 
instructions published by the Food and Drug 
Administration when it approved the 
medication in 2000. 
The problem is that after 13 years, with 
millions of medical abortions having been 
provided in Europe and Asia as well as the 
United States, medical opinion about the 
appropriate dosage and other aspects of 
administering the drugs has evolved, as it 
often does after a new medication enters 
widespread use. Instead of 600 milligrams 
of Mifeprex, doctors now use only 200. 
While the original F.D.A. label specified 
that the drugs should be used only up to 49 
days of pregnancy, doctors have found the 
regimen safe and effective for up to 63 days 
— nine weeks of pregnancy. Instead of 
requiring a second office visit for the second 
drug, as specified by the F.D.A., doctors 
now often give the patient the second drug 
to be taken at home, saving her an 
unnecessary trip. The 200-milligram 
regimen is so widely accepted that the 600-
milligram dose is now considered bad 
medicine, and many doctors would refuse 
the procedure entirely rather than follow the 
old guideline. 
Post-approval modifications in the way 
doctors use drugs are known as off-label 
uses. Off-label usage is extremely common, 
permitted by federal law. Prescribing anti-
depressants to treat nerve pain and 
menopausal hot flashes is one current 
example. What’s unusual about the medical 
abortion situation is that doctors are simply 
prescribing less of an approved drug for its 
approved use, rather than turning a drug to a 
different use altogether. 
In the Oklahoma case, a state trial judge, 
Donald L. Worthington, reviewed the 
evidence and found that the lower dose of 
Mifeprex was being used “in a great 
majority of cases of medication abortions in 
the United States” and had been 
“demonstrated by scientific research to be 
safer and more effective” than the original 
F.D.A.-approved dose. Requiring doctors to 
use the higher dose, the judge concluded in 
an opinion in May of last year, was “so 
completely at odds with the standard that 
governs the practice of medicine that it can 
serve no purpose other than to prevent 
women from obtaining abortions and to 
punish and discriminate against those 
women who do.” The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision last December. 
Unlike the trial judge’s eight-page opinion, 
however, the state high court’s unanimous 
three-paragraph opinion offered no analysis. 
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It simply declared that “this matter is 
controlled by the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,” a decision that “remains binding on 
this court until and unless the United States 
Supreme Court holds to the contrary.” 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey was the 1992 
decision that reaffirmed the basic right to 
abortion while also permitting states to 
adopt new restrictions. In its opinion, which 
Justice Kennedy joined, the court said it 
would permit restrictions that did not impose 
an “undue burden,” defined in the opinion as 
“a state regulation that has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.” More than two decades 
later, all the important words in that 
definition of undue burden remain contested. 
What kind of obstacle is “substantial”? What 
is a prohibited “effect”? To the present 
point: does the court really care about 
“purpose” — the real purpose behind an 
abortion restriction — or is it satisfied by a 
state’s counter-factual claim that the purpose 
is to protect women? 
In a brief he filed three weeks ago to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, E. Scott Pruitt, 
the state’s attorney general, said the 
legislature’s purpose “was to solve the 
problem of physicians using potentially 
dangerous unapproved protocols.” Really? 
Requiring doctors to prescribe three times 
more of a drug than they think is called for 
is a safety improvement? When Gov. Mary 
Fallin signed the bill in May 2011, she was 
more candid, calling it “a critical part of our 
effort to promote the cause of life.” Does 
candor matter to the Supreme Court? 
It didn’t to Justice Kennedy when he wrote 
the partial-birth abortion majority opinion in 
2007. He accepted as fact a claim for which 
there was no valid basis: that the prohibited 
procedure placed women at special jeopardy 
for acute post-abortion regret, “grief more 
anguished and sorrow more profound,” as he 
put it. As evidence, he cited a brief filed on 
behalf of “180 Women Injured by 
Abortion,” a document filled with personal 
“affidavits” by women who described 
vividly how sorry they were for having had 
terminated their pregnancies (notably, few 
actually discussed any particular method of 
abortion). 
Lo and behold, the new case has brought 
with it to the Supreme Court a “Brief of 
Women and Families Hurt by RU-486,” 
filed in support of the state’s appeal by the 
same lawyer who organized and filed the 
earlier brief. It, too, contains personal 
testimonies, although not one actually says 
anything on the question before the court of 
more Mifeprex or less. 
Not knowing Oklahoma judicial politics, I 
can only guess at the reason for the state 
court’s failure to analyze the case instead of 
invoking Planned Parenthood v. Casey is a 
purely conclusory fashion. At the least, the 
three-paragraph opinion was odd. Were the 
Oklahoma justices simply ducking for cover 
under the shadow of Casey? Or were they 
inviting, even prodding, the Supreme Court 
to reconsider Casey? Along with Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was 
also a member of the five-justice majority in 
1992. With Justice O’Connor replaced by 
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., there may no 
longer be a majority on the court to strike 
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down any burden on access to abortion, even 
one that is obviously and purposefully 
“undue.” All that binds the current court to 
the Casey standard — whatever that 
standard can be said to mean today — is 
stare decisis, respect for precedent. As the 
Roberts court begins Year 9, that may not 
count for much. 
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“Oklahoma Abortion Laws Unconstitutional, State Supreme Court Rules” 
Huffington Post 
Tim Talley 
December 4, 2012 
Oklahoma laws requiring women seeking 
abortions to have an ultrasound image 
placed in front of them while they hear a 
description of the fetus and that ban off-
label use of certain abortion-inducing drugs 
are unconstitutional, the state Supreme 
Court ruled Tuesday. 
The state's highest court determined that 
lower court judges were right to halt the 
laws. In separate decisions, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court said the laws, which 
received wide bipartisan support in the 
Legislature, violated a 1992 U.S. Supreme 
Court case. 
The Oklahoma court said it has a duty to 
"follow the mandate of the United State 
Supreme Court on matters of federal 
constitutional law." 
The Legislature passed the ultrasound law in 
2010. Oklahoma is one of several states that 
have passed laws requiring doctors to both 
perform an ultrasound and provide a verbal 
description of the fetus before an abortion. 
The other law was approved in 2011. 
The New York-based Center for 
Reproductive Rights challenged both laws, 
and Oklahoma County judges had halted 
their enforcement while the court cases 
made their way through the judicial system. 
Michelle Movahed, a staff attorney for the 
abortion-rights group, said the rulings 
represent a "sweeping and unequivocal" 
rejection of the Legislature's attempt to 
restrict the reproductive rights of women. 
Nancy Northup, the center's president and 
CEO, said Oklahoma has been a testing 
ground for a national network of 
organizations she said are hostile to women, 
doctors and the rights of both. 
"But despite their best efforts to chip away 
at women's fundamental rights, the courts 
have consistently rejected these extreme 
assaults on reproductive freedom," Northrup 
said in a statement. 
State Attorney General Scott Pruitt, whose 
office appealed lower-court decisions that 
invalidated the laws, said he is considering 
appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
"We disagree with the court's decision, 
particularly with the fact that the question on 
whether Oklahoma's Constitution provides a 
right to an abortion was left unanswered," 
Pruitt said in a statement. 
The ultrasound law was struck down in 
March by District Judge Bryan Dixon, who 
ruled that the statute was an unconstitutional 
special law that could not be enforced 
because it addressed only patients, 
physicians and sonographers dealing with 
abortions without addressing other medical 
care. 
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Tony Lauinger, chairman of the anti-
abortion group Oklahomans for Life, said he 
believes the state Supreme Court has 
misinterpreted the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision. He said the Oklahoma ultrasound 
measure provides a level of informed 
consent for women seeking abortions, 
something he said the federal decision 
permits. 
"The ultrasound law does not prohibit 
abortion. It regulates abortion," Lauinger 
said. 
The other state law was rejected in May by 
District Judge Donald Worthington, who 
ruled it violated "the fundamental rights of 
women to privacy and bodily integrity." 
The law required doctors to follow strict 
guidelines authorized by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration and prohibited off-
label uses of certain abortion-inducing drugs 
such as RU-486. Such moves include 
changing a recommended dosage or 
prescribing it for different symptoms than 
the drug was initially approved for. 
The law also required doctors to examine 
women before prescribing the drugs, 
document certain medical conditions and 
schedule follow-up appointments. 
Pruitt said he was disappointed with the 
court's decision. 
"There is overwhelming evidence that the 
off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs 
leads to serious infections and death for 
many healthy, unsuspecting women. This is 
not OK," Pruitt said. 
All nine justices on the court joined in the 
decision involving the abortion-inducing 
drugs, while eight justices concurred in the 
ultrasound ruling. Justice Noma Gurich, a 
former Oklahoma County judge who issued 
an injunction blocking enforcement of that 
law in July 2010, recused herself from the 
decision. 
Earlier this year, the state Supreme Court 
halted an effort to grant "personhood" rights 
to human embryos, citing the same 1992 
U.S. Supreme Court case. The U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to take up the case on appeal. 
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Review Oklahoma Abortion Pill Case” 
Christian Science Monitor 
Warren Richey 
June 27, 2013 
At issue is whether an Oklahoma law 
requires women and their doctors to follow a 
protocol that effectively limits access to 
chemically induced abortions. But first, the 
Supreme Court wants clarification on what, 
exactly, the state law outlaws. 
The US Supreme Court on Thursday agreed 
to wade into a dispute over 
an Oklahoma regulation of the abortion-
inducing drug RU-486. 
In a brief order, the justices agreed to take 
up the case, and then asked the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court to determine whether the 
disputed state law bars the application of 
certain drugs used in chemically induced 
abortions. 
The court said that further proceedings in 
the case would be reserved pending receipt 
of a response from the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma. 
The action came in an appeal filed on behalf 
of the Oklahoma attorney general asking the 
justices to reinstate an Oklahoma law 
regulating RU-486 abortions that was struck 
down by the state high court in December. 
The law sought to limit chemically induced 
abortions to a protocol of procedures that 
critics said were outdated and would 
effectively ban the procedure. 
In his brief to the court, Oklahoma Solicitor 
General Patrick Wyrick asked the justices to 
examine whether the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court ruled correctly when it invalidated the 
2011 state law that had mandated that all 
drug-induced abortions in the state follow a 
specific protocol. 
Under the law, abortion providers were 
required to follow instructions approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration back in 
2000 when chemically induced abortions 
were first approved. 
The Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive 
Justice challenged the law, arguing that the 
2000 protocol had since become obsolete 
and had been replaced by newer time-tested 
procedures and doses that were safer, more 
effective, and less expensive. 
The new procedures allow a woman to self-
administer a second drug at home rather 
than in a clinic. They also extended the 
effective use of the chemically induced 
abortion process from 49 days into the 
pregnancy to 63 days. 
Mr. Wyrick said the state legislature was 
justified in favoring the older protocol 
because eight otherwise healthy young 
women have died from bacterial infections 
following chemically induced abortions 
using one of the newer protocols. In 
contrast, he said, no women have died 
following use of the older protocol. 
The state solicitor general said the 
Oklahoma law merely regulates the manner 
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in which abortion-inducing drugs were 
administered and does not ban the use of 
those drugs. 
A state court judge struck the statute down, 
because it was deemed to impose a 
substantial obstacle to a woman obtaining an 
abortion. 
The judge concluded in part that the state 
law “is so completely at odds with the 
standard that governs the practice of 
medicine that it can serve no purpose other 
than to prevent women from obtaining 
abortions, and to punish and discriminate 
against those who do.” 
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
ruled that the state law was unconstitutional 
under the US Supreme Court’s abortion 
precedent, Planned Parenthood of 
Pennsylvania v. Casey. 
Wyrick said the state high court was wrong. 
“House Bill 1970 does not prohibit any type 
of abortion,” he said in his brief to the court. 
“It merely requires that abortion inducing 
drugs be administered in the manner 
approved by the FDA.” 
Michelle Movahed, a lawyer with the Center 
for Reproductive Rights, which is 
representing the Oklahoma Coalition, said in 
her brief that the Oklahoma law goes too far 
in restricting access to abortions. 
She said the Oklahoma legislature had 
enacted several laws in recent years seeking 
to restrict abortions in the state. The state 
Supreme Court has upheld some, but 
overturned others as too restrictive. 
“The statute at issue here effectively bans all 
abortions performed using medication 
(rather than by surgery), no matter how early 
in the pregnancy,” Ms. Movahed wrote in 
her brief. 
“The statute’s only practical consequence is 
to force a woman who wishes to terminate a 
pregnancy to undergo a surgical procedure 
even though a safe, effective, non-invasive, 
and widely used alternative is available,” 
she said. 
Movahed said the newer protocols were 
legal and common. She said nationwide 
protocols other than FDA approved protocol 
from 2000 are being used in at least 96 
percent of chemically induced abortions. 
The case is Terry Cline v. Oklahoma 
Coalition for Reproductive Justice (12-
1094). 
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“State Laws Limiting Abortion May Face Challenges on 20-Week Limit” 
NPR 
Julie Rovner 
July 22, 2013 
Banning abortions after a specific point in 
pregnancy has been a popular trend in the 
states this year. Last week, GOP Gov. Rick 
Perry made Texas the 12th state to ban most 
abortions after 20 weeks. 
But how states define the starting point for 
that 20 weeks may cause headaches for 
women and their doctors — and ultimately 
affect whether these laws pass constitutional 
muster. 
Like all but one of the abortion bans passed 
so far in the states, the Texas law starts its 
20-week calendar at fertilization. But that's 
not the same as saying 20 weeks of 
pregnancy, because that's not how doctors 
measure pregnancy. 
"When we refer to the weeks of pregnancy, 
weeks of gestation, we measure pregnancy 
from the date of the last normal menstrual 
period," says Dr. Daniel Grossman. He's an 
assistant professor of obstetrics, gynecology 
and reproductive sciences at the University 
of California, San Francisco and a vice 
president of IBIS Reproductive Health, a 
reproductive rights advocacy group. 
"For a woman who has a normal menstrual 
period, ovulation or fertilization would 
generally occur two weeks later, after that 
start of that normal menstrual period," 
Grossman says. "The age of the embryo or 
the fetus is essentially two weeks less than 
the number of weeks measured from the last 
menstrual period." 
Last menstrual period, or LMP, is generally 
how doctors refer to the weeks of 
pregnancy. Forty weeks LMP is considered 
full term for a normal pregnancy, even 
though at that point fertilization occurred 
only 38 weeks before. So why do doctors 
use a measurement that's so imprecise? 
That standard developed in the old days 
before ultrasound was widely used, 
Grossman says. "The last menstrual period 
was something that was knowable and was 
measurable, whereas it wasn't always known 
when fertilization took place." 
With few exceptions, however, that's not 
how the state laws — and a bill that passed 
the U.S. House last month — are being 
written. 
"What we're seeing with these laws is that 
they are pegging the beginning of pregnancy 
to fertilization," says Elizabeth Nash, who 
tracks state issues for the Guttmacher 
Institute, an abortion rights think tank. 
"So when we talk about a law that bans 
abortion at 20 weeks post-fertilization, we're 
really talking about a law that bans abortion 
at 22 weeks of pregnancy," she says. 
Why is it, then that people keep referring to 
these as 20 week laws? 
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Nash says it's not that hard to figure out. 
"That's the term that is used in the bill, and 
oftentimes when you see a term used in the 
bill it becomes the headline," she says. 
But whether the laws seek to ban abortion at 
20 weeks or 22 weeks, one thing is clear, 
says Daniel Grossman. The ban they would 
impose is earlier than what's currently 
considered viability, or when a fetus can 
survive outside the womb. 
"I think there's definitely consensus that 
viability doesn't happen before 24 menstrual 
weeks," he says. "So when we're talking 
about banning abortion at 20 or 22 weeks 
even, that's clearly at least two weeks before 
the earliest point in pregnancy where 
viability would be a concern." 
That's important, because current Supreme 
Court precedent says states can't ban 
abortion before viability. But those pushing 
these laws clearly hope that by the time one 
of these laws makes its way to the justices, 
they might change their minds. 
Similar doubts were raised about about the 
constitutionality of an earlier ban few 
thought would survive court scrutiny, 
according to Douglas Johnson of the 
National Right to Life Committee. 
"The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act was 
struck down by every lower fed court that 
considered it," Johnson said last week at a 
press conference on the federal version of 
the 20-week ban. "Three U.S. District 
Courts; three U.S. Courts of Appeals all 
ruled it was in clear violation of U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent. But when it 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court they said 
otherwise. And they upheld it." 
So whether you count to 20 or 22, the 
ultimate number that will matter most is five 
— the number of Supreme Court justices 
needed for a majority. 
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“Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press 
Fight” 
The New York Times 
Manny Fernandez 
July 18, 2013 
Six months after declaring his goal to make 
abortion at any stage “a thing of the past,” 
Gov. Rick Perry signed a bill into law 
Thursday giving Texas some of the toughest 
restrictions on abortion in the country, even 
as women’s rights advocates vowed to 
challenge the law’s legality in court. 
Surrounded by Republican legislators and 
abortion opponents in an auditorium at the 
Texas Capitol in Austin, Mr. Perry said they 
were celebrating and cementing “the 
foundation on which the culture of life in 
Texas is built upon.” As he spoke, the chants 
and shouts of “Shame! Shame!” by the bill’s 
opponents, gathered outside the auditorium, 
could be heard. 
The measure, House Bill 2, bans abortions 
after 20 weeks of pregnancy, requires 
abortion clinics to meet the same standards 
as hospital-style surgical centers and 
mandates that a doctor have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of 
the facility where he or she performs 
abortions. 
Abortion rights advocates and Democrats 
said the law could force a majority of the 
state’s 42 abortion clinics to close. The new 
provision that clinics be licensed as 
ambulatory surgery centers would require 
costly renovations or relocations to meet the 
architectural and equipment standards. 
Only five abortion clinics — in Austin, San 
Antonio, Dallas and Houston — meet those 
standards. The requirement that doctors 
performing abortions have admitting 
privileges at nearby hospitals could force the 
closing of some clinics that use visiting 
doctors or that are located where local 
hospitals refuse to provide such privileges. 
Mr. Perry and other Republicans said the 
law would improve patient safety and hold 
abortion clinics to safer standards. 
Opponents said that it amounted to an 
unconstitutional attack on legal abortion in 
Texas and that many of the restrictions were 
found to be medically unnecessary by 
physicians groups. 
“The fight over this law will move to the 
courts, while the bigger fight for women’s 
access to health care in Texas gains steam,” 
said Cecile Richards, the president of the 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
and the Planned Parenthood Action Fund, 
and a daughter of Ann Richards, the former 
Texas governor. “People are enraged by this 
law, and it has created a whole new 
generation of activists who are in it for the 
long run to elect leaders who will protect 
women’s health.” 
The law does not take effect immediately. 
The admitting privileges restriction and the 
ban on abortions after 20 weeks take effect 
90 days after a special legislative session 
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ends later this month. Abortion clinics have 
until September 2014 to comply with the 
surgical-center standards. Opponents of the 
law said they were evaluating their litigation 
options, and it appeared likely that lawsuits 
would be filed before any of the restrictions 
take effect. 
Similar restrictions that have been enacted in 
other states have been tied up in legal 
challenges. Bans on abortions after 20 
weeks have been adopted by 11 other states, 
but in three of those states — Arizona, 
Georgia and Idaho — courts have blocked 
the laws from taking effect. The requirement 
that doctors have admitting privileges at a 
nearby hospital has been blocked by courts 
in Mississippi, Alabama and North Dakota. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled 
that states can regulate abortions so long as 
the rules do not pose an “undue burden” on 
a woman’s right to an abortion. Opponents 
of the law are likely to argue that the 
surgical-center standards and their effect on 
women seeking abortions across the state 
pose an undue burden and are thus 
unconstitutional. 
“The A.C.L.U. is involved in litigation in 5 
of the 10 states where similar abortion 
restrictions have been enacted, and we are 
evaluating our options in Texas,” said Terri 
Burke, the executive director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Texas. 
“What makes Texas different is our size: 
House Bill 2 leaves 35 percent of the 
population without access to abortion care 
and those are rural and, often, poor women.” 
The provision banning abortions at 20 weeks 
after fertilization and later is based on a 
medically disputed theory that a fetus can 
feel pain at that stage. The Supreme Court 
has ruled that women have a right to an 
abortion until the point at which the fetus is 
viable outside the womb — usually around 
24 weeks after a woman’s last menstrual 
period, or 22 weeks after fertilization. 
Mr. Perry addressed the issue of fetal pain at 
the bill-signing ceremony on Thursday. “At 
five months, many studies indicate that these 
children feel pain,” he said, adding that it 
was Texans’ responsibility “to give voice to 
the unborn individuals whose survival is at 
stake.” 
The ceremony was a procedural coda to the 
heated battle over abortion that has played 
out at the Capitol. Thousands of men and 
women — on the both sides of the debate, 
though opponents of the bill largely 
outnumbered supporters — have testified, 
rallied and protested there since June, when 
Mr. Perry added the bill to the Legislature’s 
agenda. 
The bill failed to pass during the regular 
session, which ended May 27, so Mr. Perry 
added it on June 11 to a special session in an 
effort to get it passed. But at the end of the 
special session on June 25, an 11-hour 
filibuster by State Senator Wendy Davis, 
Democrat of Fort Worth, helped kill the bill, 
turning her into a national political celebrity. 
Mr. Perry responded by calling a second 
special session, and the Republican-
dominated Legislature quickly passed the 
restrictions last week. Though their efforts 
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to block the bill had ultimately failed, 
Democrats have been emboldened by the 
filibuster and the battle over abortion. In 
June, Ms. Davis received nearly $1 million 
in campaign contributions in two weeks. She 
received more than 15,000 individual 
contributions, many from people who gave 
her $50 or less. 
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“California Abortion Bill Shows Gulf with Other States” 
Bloomberg 
Michael B. Marois & Esme E. Deprez 
August 28, 2013 
To see the growing gulf over abortion 
between California and other states, look no 
further than the Colorado River that marks 
the state’s border with Arizona. 
On the California side, a bill heading soon to 
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown would 
make it easier for rural women to terminate 
pregnancies by allowing nurse practitioners 
and midwives to perform abortions in the 
first 12 weeks, now provided only by 
doctors. 
Across the river in Arizona, Republican 
Governor Jan Brewer effectively banned 
nurse practitioners from doing the 
procedures in 2011. Five Planned 
Parenthood clinics stopped offering 
abortions when doctors couldn’t be found, 
according to Cynde Cerf, a spokeswoman. 
California “completely bucks the trend that 
we’ve been seeing in other states in the past 
three years, which is to adopt abortion 
restrictions en masse,” said Elizabeth Nash, 
state issues manager for the New York-
based Guttmacher Institute, which 
researches and compiles reproductive health 
data. “This is moving in a completely 
different direction than what we are seeing 
in other states.” 
The California measure, approved this week 
by the Democrat-controlled state Senate, 
contrasts with at least 178 laws restricting 
abortion that other states have passed since 
2010, according to the institute. The laws 
have made it more difficult for women to get 
abortions, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1973 decision in Roe v. Wade that legalized 
a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. 
Five States 
If signed into law by Brown, California 
would be the fifth state to permit non-
physician abortions, joining Montana, New 
Hampshire, Oregon and Vermont, according 
to a study by the University of California, 
San Francisco. Thirty-nine states require a 
licensed physician. 
The author of the California bill, Assembly 
Majority Leader Toni Atkins, a San Diego 
Democrat, said the legislation was needed to 
help women in the half of the state’s 
counties without a doctor to perform 
abortions. The Senate version of the bill will 
go back to the Assembly to reconcile 
amendments before it’s sent to Brown. 
Arizona’s law signed by Brewer two years 
ago prohibited the state nursing board from 
determining whether abortion care was 
within the scope of practice for nurse 
practitioners. 
The effect was immediate. There are seven 
abortion clinics in the state today, down 
from 19 in 2010 because of the measure and 
other restrictive laws, according to NARAL 
Pro-Choice Arizona, which opposes the 
limits. 
 495 
Local Facilities 
Eighty-seven percent of U.S. counties have 
no local facilities for abortion, according to 
the University of California study. Those 
areas are home to more than a third of 
women aged 15 to 44, the study showed. 
A similar California bill failed last year after 
some Democrats said they were concerned 
that abortions performed by non-physicians 
wouldn’t be as safe. That measure was 
amended to allow nurse practitioners and 
other clinicians to dispense abortion-
inducing drugs, and was signed Brown. 
Many of the anti-abortion laws passed in 
recent years have been argued on the basis 
that they improve health and safety. They 
have also proven effective at shuttering 
providers: In addition to Arizona, 
restrictions have been blamed for closing at 
least a dozen clinics in states including 
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
A University of California study published 
in January in the American Journal of Public 
Health found that complications from 
abortions by nurse practitioners, nurse 
midwives or physician’s assistants were 
“clinically equivalent” to those performed 
by doctors. 
“I can’t think of a single national trend that 
California isn’t bucking,” said Brian 
Johnston, the Western Regional Director at 
the National Right to Life Committee. “The 
reality is that a human life must end for this 
to be an abortion and so this is an issue of 
huge significance, and other states recognize 
that.” 
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“Anti-Abortion Laws Take Dramatic Toll On Clinics Nationwide” 
Huffington Post 
Laura Bassett 
August 26, 2013 
More than 50 abortion clinics across the 
country have closed or stopped offering the 
procedure since a heavy wave of legislative 
attacks on providers began in 2010, 
according to The Huffington Post's 
nationwide survey of state health 
departments, abortion clinics and local 
abortion-focused advocacy groups. 
 
At least 54 abortion providers across 27 
states have shut down or ended their 
abortion services in the past three years, and 
several more clinics are only still open 
because judges have temporarily blocked 
legislation that would make it difficult for 
them to continue to operate. Nebraska and 
Massachusetts have each added one clinic 
since 2010, and the other 21 states and the 
District of Columbia, most of which have 
not passed new anti-abortion laws since 
2010, were unable to accurately count their 
clinics because their health departments do 
not license abortion providers separately 
from other kinds of medical providers. The 
Huffington Post's tally did not include 
hospitals that provide abortions. 
 
"This kind of change is incredibly 
dramatic," said Elizabeth Nash, state issues 
manager at the Guttmacher Institute, a 
reproductive health research organization. 
"What we've been seeing since 1982 was a 
slow decline, but this kind of change ... [is] 
so different from what's happened in the 
past." 
A comprehensive survey by The Daily Beast 
found that as of January 2013, 724 abortion 
clinics remained operational across the U.S. 
 
While some of the 54 closures were due to 
unrelated factors, the states that have lost the 
most clinics over the past three years are the 
same ones that have seen draconian new 
abortion restrictions and the biggest cuts to 
family planning funding. In Texas, which 
has lost nine clinics, lawmakers have 
slashed family planning funding in the state 
budget, required abortion clinics to become 
ambulatory surgical centers and required 
abortion doctors to have admitting privileges 
at a local hospital. Arizona lawmakers 
passed similar legislation and pushed out a 
total of 12 providers; the state had 18 
abortion clinics in 2010 and now has only 
six, according to NARAL Pro-Choice 
Arizona. 
 
"This has turned into a nightmare," said Kat 
Sabine, executive director of NARAL's 
Arizona affiliate. "The kind of efforts the 
women have to take to get family planning 
or abortion services are just incredible, and 
you can only get care if you can get out of 
the community to do it. If you're on a 
reservation or rural part of the state, unless 
you have reliable transportation, you're not 
going to get care." 
 
In Lake Havusu, Ariz., there are several 
anti-abortion Crisis Pregnancy Centers and a 
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Catholic charity hospital that does not offer 
abortion care, but women have to travel over 
150 miles to either Phoenix or Las Vegas to 
find the nearest abortion or family planning 
clinic, Sabine said. The situation mirrors 
problems rural women face in other states. 
Mississippi, North Dakota and South Dakota 
have only one abortion clinic each, and the 
first two are hanging onto their only clinics 
pending court decisions. Other larger states, 
like Alaska and Texas, do not have nearly 
enough providers to respond to the needs of 
women in rural areas, because the clinics are 
concentrated in a few major cities. 
 
Compounding the problem, 26 states require 
women to wait at least 24 hours between 
their consultation sessions and abortion 
procedures, making it twice as difficult for 
rural and low-income women to access 
abortion care. 
 
"These restrictions have an uneven impact," 
Nash said. "Women who have resources, 
have a car, have some money in the bank, 
can access childcare and take time off work 
can obtain an abortion, and women who are 
less well-off and don't have those kinds of 
resources are not able to access abortion 
services." 
 
While states have been passing abortion 
restrictions since long before 2010, the 
recent legislative trend has been to directly 
target abortion providers and make it harder 
for them to operate. In addition to passing 
mandatory waiting periods and mandatory 
ultrasounds, states are passing so-called 
"TRAP" laws -- the Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Providers. These laws often 
require abortion clinics to undergo extensive 
and costly renovations in order to become 
ambulatory surgical centers, which are 
essentially mini-hospitals. 
 
Anti-abortion advocates, meanwhile, argue 
that TRAP laws are designed to protect 
women's health by forcing clinics to widen 
their hallways, install specific ventilation 
systems and build locker rooms for 
physicians. Kristi Hamrick, a spokesperson 
for Americans United for Life, told HuffPost 
that the new restrictions are not the reason 
clinics are shutting down. "It was the choice 
of the abortion industry to locate their 
profitable abortion businesses in older 
buildings that would never pass muster for 
other outpatient surgical centers," she said. 
"It was their choice to ignore the laws of any 
given state on building requirements for 
outpatient medical facilities -- set by that 
state in line with a national standards board, 
not AUL -- and choose locations that were 
not as safe." 
 
Hamrick added that the fact that most of the 
available information on abortion clinic 
closures comes from the clinics themselves 
is evidence of the fact that states do not 
regulate the clinics enough. While some 
state health departments have specific 
licenses for abortion providers, states vary 
widely in how they count providers. Some 
only license ambulatory surgical centers that 
provide abortions, and others have no 
separate category for abortion providers, 
making it difficult to get an accurate count 
of how many providers there are without 
thumbing through the phone book. 
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"While the abortion industry has claimed 
that their businesses have suffered, we have 
only their word on that," she said. 
 
The murder trial of Kermit Gosnell, the 
abortion provider in Pennsylvania who 
performed illegal, late-term abortions and 
allegedly "snipped" the spines of fetuses 
born alive, has fueled the drive to regulate 
abortion clinics even further. A group of 
House Republicans wrote letters to the 
health departments and attorneys general of 
all 50 states in May, citing the Gosnell trial 
and asking what exactly states are doing to 
"protect the civil rights of newborns and 
their mothers." 
 
RH Reality Check obtained 38 states' 
responses to that inquiry and published 
them. The publication's analysis of the 
documents concluded that abortion clinics in 
most states are aggressively regulated and 
extremely safe. 
 
"Most states said that they conduct regular 
inspections of abortion clinics, or of 
hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, or 
other types of facilities where abortions can 
be carried out," RH Reality Check reported. 
"And most states said they were aware of 
very few — if any — incidents of patients 
being harmed as a result of an abortion." 
 
Still, Republicans at the state and federal 
level are proposing new ways to restrict 
abortion every time a legislative session 
begins, giving women in their states fewer 
and fewer options when faced with an 
unplanned or unhealthy pregnancy. 
 
"These restrictions do nothing to reduce the 
need for abortion or to reduce unintended 
pregnancy," Nash said. "I would say that 
those that are promoting these very 
burdensome clinic regulations have as an 
end goal the elimination of legal abortion. 
They don't have women's health in mind." 
 
 
